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Ⅰ Introduction
 
After the Japan’s Great Earthquake in March 2011,many coun-
tries have imposed shipment restrictions upon Japanese goods.For
 
example, in the U.S., as of July 18, 2016, milk from Fukushima
 
prefecture is subject to refusal of admission pursuant to the Federal
 
Food,Drug,and Cosmetic Act (“FD & C Act”),Section 801(a)
(1)
(3)
because, according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”),it appears to contain a radionuclide,a poisonous or delete-
rious substance which may render it injurious to health(adulteration,
FD & C Act,Section 402
(2)(3)
(a)(1)).
This measure taken by the FDA(the“measure”)can be regard-
ed as a sanitary or phytonsaitary measure (the “SPS measure”)
within the meaning of the sentence 1(b),Annex A to the Agreement
 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the
“SPS Agreement”). This is because the FDA clearly refers to the
 
public health concerns as follows:“The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
 
plant houses several nuclear reactors that pose of a potential threat
 
of radiological contamination to the surrounding areas.Due to the
(1)200
public health concerns that are associated with radiation and nuclear
 
contamination,FDA has increased surveillance of regulated products
 
from
(4)
Japan.”It is clear that the objective of the measure taken by the
 
FDA is to address the public health concerns within the United
 
States,and the purpose of the measure is to“protect human...health
 
within the territory of the Member from risks arising from...conta-
minants”(Sentence 1(b), Annex A to the Agreement on the SPS
 
Agreement).
The question then arises:is this measure in accordance with the
 
SPS Agreement? This paper is intended to analyze legal issues
 
relating to this shipment restriction.
Free trade is one of the fundamentals in today’s globalized
(5)
economy.However,it is also important to protect human,animal or
 
plant life or health.In order to avoid“disguised protectionism,”the
 
SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay
(6)
Round.
The SPS Agreement provides the right of the Members to take
 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of
 
human,animal or plant life or health(Article 2.1 of the SPS Agree-
ment). In the Australia-Salmon case (defined hereinafter), the
 
Appellate Body pointed out that the level of protection deemed
 
appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary measure is a
“prerogative of the Member
(7)
concerned.”The reason for admitting
 
such a strong privilege to the Members is because sanitary and
 
phytosanitary measures are designed to protect human, animal or
 
plant life or health,the most important and essential value within the
 
GATT Article XX(b).According to the preamble of the SPS Agree-
ment,this agreement is conceived as an elaboration of this original
 
GATT
(8)
exception.
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On the other hand,the SPS Agreement requires the Members to
 
ensure that any sanitary and phytonsanitary measure is“applied only
 
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
 
health”and that it is“based on scientific principles”and that it is not
“maintained without sufficient scientific evidence”(Article 2.2 of the
 
SPS Agreement).The Members should also ensure that their SPS
 
measures are “based on an assessment”(Article 5.1 of the SPS
 
Agreement).If relevant scientific evidence is insufficient,a Member
 
may provisionally adopt SPS measures (Article 5.7 of the SPS
 
Agreement).
To develop some prescriptive implications,I will examine three
 
important cases regarding the SPS Agreement to the extent neces-
sary,namely,(1)Appellate Body Report,European Communities-EC
 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),WT/
DS26/AB/R;WT/DS48/AB/R,adopted on February 13,1998,DSR
 
1998:I, 135 (“EC-Hormones”),(2)Appellate Body Report, Japan-
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products,WT/DS76/AB/R,adopt-
ed on March 19,1999,DSR 1999:I,277(“Japan-Agriculture”),and
(3)Appellate Body Report,Japan-Measures Affecting the Importa-
tion of Apples,WT/DS245/AB/R, adopted on December 10, 2003,
DSR 2003:IX,4391(“Japan-Apples”).
With regard to other cases, namely, Panel Report, European
 
Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
 
Biotech Products,WT/DS291/R,WT/DS292/R,WT/DS293/R,adop-
ted on November 21, 2006 (“EC-Biotech”), Panel Report, United
 
States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China,
WT/DS392/R,adopted on October 25,2010(“US-China(Poultry)”),
and Appellate Body Report,Australia-Measures Affecting Importa-
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tion of Salmon,WT/DS18/AB/R,adopted on November 6,1998,DSR
 
1998:VIII,3327(“Australia-Salmon”),I will discuss these as may be
 
necessary.
Ⅱ SPS Agreement
? The Concept of an SPS Measure
 
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws,
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter
 
alia,end product criteria;processes and production methods;testing,
inspection, certification and approval procedures;quarantine treat-
ments including relevant requirements associated with the transport
 
of animals or plants,or with the materials necessary for their sur-
vival during transport;provisions on relevant statistical methods,
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment;and packaging
 
and labeling requirements directly related to food
(9)
safety.
As a preliminary matter,it should be observed that in all cases
 
measures will be excluded from the definition of an SPS measure
 
where they seek to protect the relevant interests outside of territory
 
of the Member
(10)
concerned.Thus,a prohibition on the import of goods
 
which is concerned with the manner in which those goods have been
 
manufactured would constitute an SPS measure,in so far as the ban
 
is applied to protect one of the specified interests within the territory
 
of the regulating
(11)
state.
As discussed above,in this case,it is obvious that the measure
 
taken by the FDA constitutes an SPS measure, since the shipping
 
restraint is applied to address public health concerns within the
 
territory of the regulating state,i.e.,the U.S.Therefore,it can be said
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that the measure is applied to“protect ...health within the territory
 
of the Member”(Annex A.1(b)of the SPS Agreement).
A critical element for determining whether a substance can be
 
considered to be a“contaminant”(Annex A.1(b)of the SPS Agree-
ment)is that the presence of the substance which is said to“infect or
 
pollute”be
(12)
unintentional.
In this case, the contamination of food resulted from an un-
expected disaster, Fukushima nuclear accident. Therefore, a sub-
stance included in the milk from Fukushima prefecture can be consid-
ered as a“contaminant.”
Imposing shipment restraint to contaminant, i.e., contaminated
 
Fukushima milk,would enable the U.S.government to ensure public
 
health of its nation,because it can stop such contaminated milk from
 
being distributed in the domestic market.Therefore,we can conclude
 
that the measure taken by the FDA constitutes an SPS measure as
 
provided by Annex A.1(b)of the SPS Agreement.
? Framework of the SPS Agreement
 
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement forms part of the“basic rights
 
and obligations”laid down in the
(13)
agreement.It requires that Mem-
bers shall ensure that any SPS measure is“applied only to the extent
 
necessary to protect human,animal or plant life or health,”and that
 
it is “based on scientific principles”and “not maintained without
 
sufficient scientific evidence,”except as provided by Article
(14)
5.7.
Article 5.7, referred to in Article 2.2, allows Members to take
“provisional”measures where there is insufficient scientific evidence
 
to be sure of the risks
(15)
involved.
Article 5.1 requires that SPS measures should be based on an
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assessment of the risks to human,animal or plant life or
(16)
health.
Article 3.3 permits Members to refrain from basing their mea-
sures on international standards, if, inter alia, there is a scientific
 
justification for so
(17)
doing.
As stated in EU-Hormones,Article 5.1 is a“specific application”
of the basic obligations contained in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agree-
(18)
ment.In EC-Biotech,the panel recalls the Appellate Body’s construc-
tion of this relationship,but further refines it,viewing Article 5.1 as
 
a “specific application of the second and third obligations provided
 
for in Article
(19)
2.2.”Such approach leads me to start by analyzing
 
Articles 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, in accordance with the Panel’s
 
decision in US-Poultry(China).Although the SPS Agreement does
 
not provide any guidance on a sequence for analyzing its provisions,
the Panel decided to“commence with Article 5.1 and 5.2 because any
 
inconsistency that the Panel finds with these provisions would by
 
implication lead to a finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2 of the
 
SPS
(20)
Agreement.”One can also conclude that where a measure is not
 
based on a risk assessment in accordance with Article 5.1, that
 
measure will also,by implication,be inconsistent with Article
(21)
2.2.
In discussing justification of the SPS measure by the FDA to
 
restrict importation of milk from Fukushima prefecture,I would like
 
to analyze Articles 2.2,5.1,and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
? Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement
 
SPS measures must be based upon a risk assessment.The con-
cept of risk assessment is defined in Annex A,paragraph 4 of the SPS
 
Agreement.
The first definition is concerned with evaluating the risks as-
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sociated with pests or
(22)
diseases.The second is concerned with evaluat-
ing risks to human or animal health,in so far as these arise from the
 
presence of the specified substances in food,beverages or
(23)
feedstuffs.
The first definition may also encompass risks to human health,but
 
only in so far as these arise from pests or diseases,and other than as
 
a result of their presence in food,beverages and
(24)
feedstuffs.
In the case of the SPS measure taken by the FDA,it is clear that
 
such SPS measure falls within the second definition,because the FDA
 
imposed shipment restrictions upon milk from Fukushima prefecture
 
considering risks arising from radiation and nuclear contamination,
not because of spread of a pest or disease within the territory of
 
Japan.Therefore, I would like to focus on the second definition of
 
risk assessment provided in Annex A, paragraph 4 of the SPS
 
Agreement.
The constituent units inherent in the second definition of risk
 
assessment are less clearly established.I would like to analyze the EC
-Hormones case here.
⑴ EC-Hormones
? Factual Aspects
 
Directive 81/602/EEC prohibits the administering to farm ani-
mals of substances having a thyrostatic action or substances having
 
an oestrogenic, androgenic or gestagenic
(25)
action. Directive 88/146/
EEC extended the prohibition of the administration to farm animals
 
of trenbolone acetate and zeranol for any purpose,and oestradiol-
17β,testosterone and progesterone for fattening
(26)
purposes.Directive
 
88/299/EEC lays down the conditions for applying the derogations,
provided for in Article 7 of Directive 88/146/EEC,from the prohibi-
tion on trade in certain categories of animals and their meat. The
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first derogation of the Directive requires EC Member States to
 
authorize trade in animals intended for reproduction and reproduc-
tive animals at the end of their career(and of meat of such animals).
The second derogation in Directive 88/299/EEC allows imports from
 
third countries of treated animals and meat of such animals under
 
guarantees equivalent to those for domestic animals and
(27)
meat.
Directive 96/22/EC replaced Directives 81/602/EEC,88/146/EEC and
 
88/299/EEC as from 1 July 1997.Of the six hormones involved in this
 
dispute,three are naturally occurring hormones produced by humans
 
and animals:oestradiol-17, progesterone and testosterone (herein-
after also referred to as natural
(28)
hormones). The other three hor-
mones involved in this dispute are artificially produced hormones:
trenbolone, zeranol and melengestrol acetate (MGA)(hereinafter
 
also referred to as synthetic
(29)
hormones). In the United States, the
 
three natural hormones may be used for medical treatment (thera-
peutic).Oestradiol-17βis also permitted for zootechnical purposes.
In the United States,the six hormones are also approved for growth
 
promotion purposes.Three of the hormones used for growth promo-
tion purposes,trenbolone,zeranol,and MGA,have no zootechnical or
 
therapeutic uses. For growth promotion purposes, five of these
 
hormones (except MGA)are formulated as pellets (with approved
 
and fixed amounts of compound)designed to be implanted in the ear
 
of the animal.The ear is discarded at slaughter.MGA is administered
 
as a feed
(30)
additive.
The United States claimed that the EC measures adversely affect
 
imports of meat and meat products and appear to be inconsistent
 
with the obligations of the European Communities under the
(31)
GATT.
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? Decisions
⒜ The Standard of Review Applicable in Proceedings Under
 
the SPS Agreement
 
This issue was raised in the appeal because the European Com-
munities contested that the Panel failed to apply an appropriate
 
standard of review in assessing certain acts of, and scientific
 
evidentiary material submitted by,the European
(32)
Communities.
The Appellate Body first points out that the SPS Agreement
 
itself and provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements
(other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement)is silent on the matter of
 
an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS
 
measures of a
(33)
Member.It then refers to Article 11 of the DSU and
 
ruled that the applicable standard is the“objective assessment of the
(34)
facts.”
⒝ The Reading of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement
-Interpretation of“Risk Assessment”
The interpretation of“Risk Assessment”was one of the critical
 
issues of this case. The Panel distinguished between “risk assess-
ment”and “risk management.”The Appellate Body reversed the
 
Panel’s
(35)
holding.
⒞ Factors to be Considered in Carrying Out a Risk Assess-
ment
 
The Appellate Body ruled as follows:
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated
 
in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in
 
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions,
but also risk in human societies as they actually exist,in other words,
the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
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world where people live and work and
(36)
die.
⒟ The Interpretation of“Based On”
The Appellate Body ruled that in order to regard that an SPS
 
measure is“based on”a risk assessment,there should be a rational
 
relationship between the measure and the risk
(37)
assessment. It also
 
concluded that a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclu-
sion that coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in
 
the SPS measure.According to the Appellate Body,the risk assess-
ment could set out both the prevailing view representing the“main-
stream”of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists
 
taking a divergent
(38)
view.
⑵ Analysis of EC-Hormones
? Risk assessment of Article 5.1
 
In the circumstances of the EC-Hormones case, the Panel
 
identified two
(39)
steps:- identify the adverse effects on human［or
 
animal］health (if any);-if such adverse effects exist,evaluate the
 
potential of occurrence of those effects.
The Appellate Body conceded that this two-step analysis is not
“substantially wrong,”while nonetheless observing that its “utility”
may be
(40)
debated.”
Three specific points are of key importance in the dispute settle-
ment bodies elucidation of this concept of risk
(41)
assessment.The first
 
relates to the distinction between the concept of“likelihood”in the
 
first definition, and that of “potential”in the
(42)
second. The second
 
concerns the question of the specificity of the risk assessment
(43)
required.The third concerns the third“prong”of the first definition,
and the obligation to consider alternative policy
(44)
options.
191(10)
Justification under International Economic Law:
from the perspective of the SPS Agreement (Takeshi Yanagi)
⒜ Likelihood and Potential
 
Whereas the first definition of risk assessment is concerned with
“evaluation of the likelihood of,”the second is concerned with “the
 
evaluation of the potential for.”Whereas“likelihood”may be equat-
ed with“probability,”“potential”is associated with mere“possibil-
(45)
ity.”
In EC-Hormones,the Appellate Body talks not only of“probabil-
ity”(aka“likelihood”)implying a higher threshold of possibility(or
 
potential), it also seems to suggest that “probability”implies the
 
introduction of a quantitative dimension;such a quantitative dimen-
sion being inappropriate in the case of “possibility”(aka “poten-
(46)
tial”). Yet, in Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body insisted that
 
evaluation of“likelihood”need not be done quantitatively.While it is
 
not sufficient for possibilities to be assessed,“［l］ikelihood may be
 
expressed either quantitatively or
(47)
qualitatively.”
Equally, evaluation of likelihood need not establish “a certain
 
magnitude or threshold level of
(48)
risk.”Hence while those responsible
 
for risk assessment must turn their mind to a different question,
depending upon whether they are acting pursuant to the first or
 
second definition,in the absence of a minimum threshold of risk in
 
relation to each,their having done so,it is hard to see how probability
 
will imply a higher threshold of
(49)
risk.
⒝ Specificity
 
There has been a heavy emphasis in the case law on the need for
 
risk assessment to be sufficiently specific to the issue at hand.This
 
has been true under both the first and second
(50)
definitions. The
 
Appellate Body has emphasized that in prescribing a specificity
 
requirement, it does not mean to constrain Members in the risk
(11)190立正法学論集第50巻第２号 (2017)
assessment methodology which they wish to
(51)
deploy.On the contrary,
they may proceed to evaluate risk on a disease by disease basis,or on
 
the basis of various hazards arising in relation to a given
(52)
commodity.
It is simply that regardless of the methodological basis on which they
 
proceed, Members must ensure that their findings are sufficiently
 
specific to the issue at
(53)
hand.
The specificity issue first came to the force in the EC-Hormones
(54)
case. Here the EC relied upon specific evidence in the form of
“general studies which do indeed show the existence of a general risk
 
of cancer;but they do not focus on and do not address the particular
 
kind of risk here at stake-the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of
 
the residues of those hormones found in meat derived from cattle to
 
which the hormones had been administered for growth promotion
 
purposes...Those general studies,are in other words,relevant but do
 
not appear to be sufficiently specific to the case at
(55)
hand.”As the
 
Appellate Body expressed it in Japan-Apples:
Under the SPS Agreement,the obligation to conduct an assess-
ment of“risk”is not satisfied merely by a general discussion of
 
the disease sought to be avoided by the imposition of a
 
phytosanitary measure. The Appellate Body found the risk
 
assessment in EC-Hormones not to be “sufficiently specific”
even though the scientific articles cited by the importing Member
 
had evaluated the“carcinogenic potential of entire categories of
 
hormones,or of the hormones at issue in general.”In order to
 
constitute a“risk assessment”as defined in the SPS Agreement,
the Appellate Body concluded,the risk assessment should have
 
reviewed the carcinogenic potential, not of the relevant hor-
mones in general, but of“residues of those hormones found in
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meat derived from cattle to which the hormones had been ad-
ministered for growth promotion of purposes.”Therefore,when
 
discussing the risk to be specified in the risk assessment in EC-
Hormones,the Appellate Body referred in general to the harm
 
concerned (cancer or genetic damage)as well as to the precise
 
agent that may possibly cause the harm (that is, the specific
 
hormones when used in a specific manner and for specific pur-
(56)
poses).
In keeping with this general conclusion,it has been found that the
 
risk assessment must evaluate risk on a disease specific basis, and
 
not simply address the overall risk related to a combination of
 
different
(57)
diseases.Likewise,for a risk assessment to be sufficiently
 
specific to the subject matter at hand, it must identify risk on a
 
product specific basis,and not on the basis of a general assessment
 
relating to a variety of different
(58)
products.This is particularly impor-
tant where there is evidence of variation in risk as between different
(59)
products.
⒞ Consideration of Alternatives
 
The first definition of risk assessment has been understood to
 
comprise three
(60)
prongs.The second definition,by contrast,encompas-
ses only
(61)
two. Under the first definition, Members are required to
 
evaluate risk according to the SPS measures which might be applied.
Under the second definition,it seems that they are
(62)
not.
The difference between the two definitions boils down, in this
 
respect, to the existence of an obligation to consider alternative
 
policy options, before settling on the regulatory approach to be
(63)
adopted.According to this,“a risk assessment should not be limited
 
to an examination of the measure already in place or favored by the
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importing
(64)
Member.”It should not be distorted by preconceived views
 
on the nature and the content of the measure to be taken,nor should
 
it develop into an exercise tailored to and carried out for the purpose
 
of justifying decisions ex post
(65)
facto.
It seems reasonable to suppose that this requirement implies the
 
existence of a corresponding prior requirement whereby Members
 
have an obligation to identify alternative policy options
(66)
available.
What is less clear is whether all such alternatives must be identified
 
and included in the analysis,however numerous and complex these
 
may
(67)
be. Japan-Apples was an easy case in this
(68)
regard. There has
 
been no consideration of any phytosanitary policy other than that
 
actually encompassed by the contested
(69)
measure. This included the
 
absence of any attempt to assess the relative effectiveness of the ten
 
constituent parts of the measure,or to consider why all of them in
 
combination were
(70)
required.Two of the experts advising the Panel
 
went so far as to suggest that the primary scientific evidence relied
 
upon“appeared to prejudge the outcome of its risk assessment”and
“was primarily concerned to show that each of the measures already
 
in place was effective in some respect,and concluded that all should
 
therefore be
(71)
applied.”In its Australia-Salmon compliance report,the
 
Panel observed that this third prong neither specifies precisely which
 
measures need to be evaluated,nor requires that “all possible mea-
sures(of which there could be a very great number)be
(72)
evaluated.”
This viewpoint has been neither endorsed, nor clarified, by the
 
Appellate
(73)
Body.
⒟ Risk Assessment as Appropriate to the Circumstances
 
We have very little guidance on what it means to say that a risk
 
assessment must be appropriate to the
(74)
circumstances.It has been said
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to relate to the way in which risk assessment is carried
(75)
out.While it
 
cannot“annual or supersede the substantive obligation”in Article
(76)
5.1,
it is said to inject“some flexibility for an assessment of risk on a case
-by-case basis,in terms of product,origin and destination,in particu-
lar country-specific
(77)
situations.”
⒠ Factors to be taken into account in Risk Assessment
 
The concept of appropriateness,in relation to risk assessment,is
 
noticeably
(78)
vague. The agreement seeks, however, to give clearer
 
shape to what is required both by laying down definitions of risk
 
assessment,and by identifying additional factors which Members are
 
required to take into
(79)
account.
Before turning to the range of factors to be taken into account,
it is important to consider the nature of the obligation which this
(80)
imposes. This was considered by the Panel in Japan-
(81)
Apples. The
 
Panel distinguished the obligation for Members to take something
 
into account, from an obligation to base their measures upon that
 
something, or to ensure that they are in comformity
(82)
with it. In
 
respect of the Article 5.1,obligation to take into account risk assess-
ment techniques developed by relevant international organizations,
the Panel observed that this implies that these techniques should be
“considered relevant,”but that “a failure to respect each an every
 
aspect of them would not necessarily, per se, signal that the risk
 
assessment is not in conformity with the requirements of Article
(83)
5.1.”
This issue has not been expressly considered by the Appellate
(84)
Body.There is,however,a suggestion that whereas the language of
“based on” in Article 5.1 connotes an “objective relationship”
between two elements,a requirement to take something into account
“refer［s］to some subjectivity which,at some time,may be present in
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particular individuals but that,in the end,may be totally rejected by
 
those
(85)
individuals.”It is true that the Appellate Body is merely
 
reporting on the Panel’s conception of what it means to take some-
thing into account. The Appellate Body neither endorses, nor dis-
tances itself,from this
(86)
understanding.
? Application
 
This is the first case regarding the SPS measures and is very
 
significant because the Appellate Body made decisions on various
 
legal issues of the SPS Agreement.The Appellate Body frequently
 
referred to this case in Australia-Salmon, Japan-Agriculture, and
 
Japan-Apples.
From this case, it can be inferred that it is important for the
 
Member imposing measures to take measures“based on assessment
...of the risks”(Article 5.1)in order to justify their measures.This
 
requirement,as well as the requirement of“scientific principles and
...scientific evidence”(Article 2.2)is very important as it balances
 
the protection of life or health with free trade.However, there are
 
many cases where science cannot provide answers.
The Appellate Body was very flexible on this point,because it
 
ruled that the risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view
 
representing the “mainstream”of scientific opinion, as well as the
 
opinions of scientists taking a divergent view.In addition, it stated
 
that the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such,nor
“total deference,”but rather the“objective assessment of the facts.”
From this,it can be inferred that the Appellate Body would respect
 
the decision made by the Member imposing measures to a substantial
 
extent, allowing much space for discretion in order to justify the
 
measures.
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? The relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.1
 
The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones viewed Article 5.1 as a
“specific application”of the basic obligation set out in
(87)(88)
Article 2.2.It
 
stresses that these two provisions should be constantly read
(89)
together.
“Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1:the elements that define the basic
 
obligation set out in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article
(90)
5.1.”As
 
such the Appellate Body expressed surprise that the Panel did not
 
adopt the “logically attractive”course, and begin its analysis by
 
focusing on the basic obligation in
(91)
Article 2.
It is though important to be aware that the Appellate Body’s
 
approach to the construction of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 is two-
(92)
way.
Article 2.2 imparts meaning to
(93)
Article 5.1.But in addition,Article 5.
1 (and Articles 3.3 and 5.7)are cited as providing context to the
 
concept of sufficiency in
(94)
Article 2.2. The Appellate Body’s conclu-
sions on the meaning of Article 5.1 are deemed “useful”and to
“provide guidance”in the construction of
(95)
Article 2.2.Thus,Articles
 
2.2 and 5.1 help to define each other,reinforcing their close relation-
ship and parallel
(96)
development. Their relationship is circular, not
 
linear,albeit Article 5.1 is presented as a specific application of the
“more general”basic obligation in
(97)
Article 2.2.
Though not initially clear in EC-Hormones,it is now settled that
 
where a measure is not based on a risk assessment in accordance with
 
Article 5.1, that measure will also, by implication, be inconsistent
 
with
(98)
Article 2.2.The Appellate Body endorsed the proposition of the
 
Panel that a measure not based on risk assessment“can be presumed,
more generally, not to be based on scientific principles or to be
 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,”and consequently
 
to be incompatible with the second and third requirements in Article
(17)184立正法学論集第50巻第２号 (2017)
(99)
2.2.The nature of the presumption,or“implication,”is not
(100)
specified.
Even if it is to be regarded as rebuttable,it implies a reversal in the
 
burden of proof for Article 2.2 for measures not based upon a risk
 
assessment in accordance with
(101)
Article 5.1.The presumption is sur-
prising in many
(102)
ways.The scope of the obligations is quite different,
and it hardly seems logical to suppose that just because there is no
 
risk assessment,or no rational relationship between a measure and a
 
risk assessment,that the measure is not in fact scientifically
(103)
founded.
It may not have been demonstrated to be so by the responding
 
Member, but that is hardly conclusive as to the state of play in
 
current scientific thinking more
(104)
generally.
At the same time,it is apparent that a reverse presumption does
 
not apply in either
(105)
direction.That a measure that does not violate
 
Article 5.1 cannot be taken to imply that it is consistent with
(106)
Article 2.2. That a measure that is inconsistent with Article 2.2
 
cannot be taken to imply that it violates Article 5.1. First, in EC-
Hormones, the Appellate Body observed that had it reversed the
 
Panel’s findings with respect to Article 5.1, it would have been
 
logically necessary to inquire whether Article 2.2 had nonetheless
 
been
(107)
violated. Second, in Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body
 
confirmed that “given the more general character of Article 2.2 not
 
all violations of Article 2.2 are covered by Article 5.1 and
(108)
Article 5.2.”
There is overlap between Articles 2.2 and 5.1 as construed by the
 
Appellate
(109)
Body.In particular the concept of a rational relationship
 
between available science and the measure in question has emerged
 
as an element of
(110)
each.The Appellate Body has eschewed a proce-
dural approach to the concept of risk assessment in Article 5.1,
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allowing Members to take decisions on the basis of assessments
 
carried out by other Members or international
(111)
organizations.Though
 
the obligations remain distinct, in that the risk assessment relied
 
upon must meet the definitions laid down in the agreement, the
 
absence of an independent procedural obligation means that Panels
 
are looking less to what Members have done,by way of assessment,
and more at what they have found by way of available science, to
 
rationally ground their
(112)
measure.
? Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
⑴ Framework of Article 2.2
 
Any measure must satisfy all three tests (applied only to the
 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
based on scientific principles;and not maintained without sufficient
 
scientific evidence.)in order to be justified under Article 2.2.There
 
has been no detailed discussion of the first two elements, and no
 
discussion of the relationship between the
(113)
parts. However, it is
 
interpreted that the requirements are
(114)
cumulative.Any measure must
 
satisfy all three tests in order to be justified under
(115)
Article 2.2.
The key question in thinking about the relationship between the
 
elements is whether the necessity test may be thought to impose any
 
distinct obligations which go beyond those implied by the science-
based requirements.Any observations on this point will necessarily
 
be tentative, but a number of factors appear to militate in the
 
direction of the conclusion that it dost
(116)
not.
First,it is not simply that the measure must be necessary,it must
 
be necessary to protect one of the specified interests (protection of
 
life or health of humans,animals or
(117)
plants).But for a measure to be
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an SPS measure,it must,by definition,be applied to protect one or
 
other of these
(118)
interests.
Second,necessity is a relational concept,pertaining to the exis-
tence of a logical connection between a measure and a specified
(119)
objective. The nature of the connection demanded is a matter for
(120)
interpretation.Elsewhere,the Appellate Body has understood this to
 
imply that the measure need not be“indispensable”to be“necessary,”
but must rather be capable of making a contribution to the objective
 
in
(121)
question.“Sufficiency”is also understood in relational terms,as
 
demanding a rational relationship between the scientific findings and
 
the measure in
(122)
question.The absence of any causal link between the
 
measure and the mitigation of risk is construed as strong evidence of
 
an absence of sufficiency;and would be pertinent also in an assess-
ment of its
(123)
necessity.Third,even it should transpire that the neces-
sity test will be read to encompass a proportionality test, the suffi-
ciency of scientific evidence test might anyway be construed to
 
encompass a proportionality
(124)
dimension.
With regard to “sufficient scientific evidence,”“sufficiency”
requires the existence of a sufficient or adequate relationship
 
between two elements, in casu, between the SPS measure and the
 
scientific
(125)
evidence.The Appellate Body finds that there is a scientific
 
justification for a measure where there is a“rational”or“objective”
relationship between that measure and the scientific
(126)
evidence.This is
 
to be determined“on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon the
 
particular circumstances of the case,including the characteristics of
 
the measure at issue and the quality and quantity of scientific
(127)
evidence.”
Two cases,i.e.Japan-Agriculture and Japan-Apples considered
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Article 2.2.I would like to analyze these two cases hereinafter.
⑵ Japan-Agriculture
? Factual Aspects
 
Japan prohibited the importation of eight agricultural products
 
originating from,inter alia,the United States on the ground that they
 
are potential hosts of codling moth,a pest quarantine significant to
 
Japan.The prohibited products are apples,cherries,peaches(includ-
ing nectarines),walnuts,apricots,pears,plums and
(128)
quince.
The import prohibition on these products can be lifted if an
 
exporting country proposes an alternative quarantine treatment
 
which achieves a level of protection equivalent to the import prohibi-
(129)
tion. In practice, the alternative quarantine treatment proposed is
 
fumigation with methyl bromide,or a combination of methyl bromide
 
fumigation and cold
(130)
storage.
? Decisions
⒜ Article 2.2.of the SPS Agreement
 
With regard to the meaning of the word“sufficient,”the Appel-
late Body referred to the cases of EC-Hormones and Australia－
Salmon,and agreed with the Panel as follows:
... the obligation in Article 2.2 that an SPS measure not be
 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence requires that there
 
be a rational or objective relationship between the SPS measure and
 
the scientific evidence. Whether there is a rational relationship
 
between an SPS measure and the scientific evidence is to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon the particular
 
circumstances of the case,including the characteristics of the mea-
sure at issue and the quality and quantity of the scientific
(131)
evidence.
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⒝ Conclusion
 
The Panel found, and the Appellate Body confirmed, that the
 
contested measure i.e.varietal testing requirements for agricultural
 
products on which codling moth might occur,was maintained without
 
sufficient scientific
(132)
evidence.
⑶ Japan-Apples
? Factual Aspects
 
Under the Plant Protection Law and the Enforcement Regula-
tions,importation of host plants of 15 quarantine pests,including fire
 
blight bacteria(Erwinia amylovora)and pests of rice plant not found
 
in Japan, is prohibited. The legislation, however, permits Japan to
 
decide,on a case-by-case basis,to lift the import prohibition under
 
certain conditions.Such conditions are summarized as follows:
? fruit must be produced in designated fire blight-free
 
orchards.
? the export orchard must be free of plants infected with fire
 
blight and free of host plants of fire blight(other than apples),
whether or not infected;
? the fire blight-free orchard must be surrounded by a 500-
meter buffer zone;
? the fire blight-free orchard and surrounding buffer zone
 
must be inspected at least three times annually;and
? harvested apples must be treated with surface disinfection
 
by soaking in sodium hypochlorite solution(100 ppm or more
 
effective chlorine concentration)for one minute or
(133)
longer.
The United States claimed that Japan prohibited the importation
 
of apples unless they were produced,treated,and imported in accor-
dance with Japan’s highly-restrictive fire blight
(134)
measures. The
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United States claimed that Japan’s measures on the importation of
 
apples were not consistent with Japan’s obligations under the SPS
(135)
Agreement.
? Decisions
 
In this case,the focus was on the third prong of Article 2.2,with
 
the Panel concluding that the measure was not justified by sufficient
 
scientific
(136)
evidence. The Panel concluded that the phytosanitary
 
measure at issue is clearly disproportionate to the risk identified on
 
the basis of the scientific evidence
(137)
available.It said that,in particu-
lar,some of the requirements applied by Japan as integral parts of
 
the measure at issue are, either individually or when applied
 
cumulatively with the other requirements of that measure, not
 
supported by sufficient scientific evidence within the meaning of
 
Article 2.2 of the SPS
(138)
Agreement.
⑷ Analysis
 
In Japan-Apples case, the Panel concluded that Japan’s multi-
faceted quarantine regime for apples,put in place to guard against
 
the risk of transmission of fire blight,was not supported by sufficient
 
scientific
(139)
evidence.The contested measure was deemed to consist of
 
ten cumulatively-applied elements,consisting of a string of product
 
and process requirements, relating to the growing environment,
treatment,storage,and
(140)
certification.The Panel did not confine its
 
analysis to mature,symptomless fruit,where the scientific evidence
 
was weakest.It looked also to other categories of apples(immature
 
or infected/infested apples)which might enter Japan by virtue of
“errors of handling”or“illegal
(141)
actions.”
For the latter category of apples,the Panel found that immature
 
apples can be infected or infested, and that infected apples are
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capable of harboring populations of bacteria that could survive
 
through the carious stages of commercial handling, storage and
(142)
transportation.Nonetheless it concluded that scientific evidence does
 
not support the conclusion that infested or infected cargo crates could
 
operate as a vector for fire blight transmission,but rather that it is
 
not likely to survive on
(143)
crates.Moreover,even if such infected apples
 
were exported to Japan,and even if the bacteria survived,the intro-
duction of fire blight into Japan would require transmission from
 
imported apples to a host
(144)
plant.This“additional sequence of events”
was “deemed unlikely”and it “has not been experimentally estab-
lished to
(145)
date.”
In the view of“negligible”nature of the risk,and the nature of
 
the elements composing the measure, the Panel concluded that the
 
quarantine regime as a whole was,on its face,disproportionate to the
 
risk, and as such that no rational or objective relationship existed
 
between the measure and the available scientific
(146)
evidence.The Panel
 
went on to find that two individual elements of the regime were
“most obviously”maintained without sufficient scientific evidence,
either separately or in
(147)
cumulation.Taking the regime as a whole,and
 
these two particularly problematic elements which form part of it,
the Panel concluded that the regime was“clearly disproportionate”
to the risk identified on the basis of available scientific
(148)
evidence.
Given the Panel’s factual findings,the Appellate Body does not
 
disagree.It is,however,somewhat enigmatic in its affirmation of the
 
Panel’s approach:
We emphasize,following the Appellate Body’s statement in
 
Japan－Agricultural Products II,that whether a given approach
 
or methodology is appropriate in order to assess whether a
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measure is maintained “without sufficient scientific evidence”,
within the meaning of Article 2.2, depends on the “particular
 
circumstances of the case”,and must be“determined on a case-
by-case basis”.Thus,the approach followed by the Panel in this
 
case－disassembling the sequence of events to identify the risk
 
and comparing it with the measure－does not exhaust the range
 
of methodologies available to determine whether a measure is
 
maintained “without sufficient scientific evidence”within the
 
meaning of Article 2.2.Approaches different from that followed
 
by the Panel in this case could also prove appropriate to evaluate
 
whether a measure is maintained without sufficient scientific
 
evidence within the meaning of Article 2.2. Whether or not a
 
particular approach is appropriate will depend on the“particular
 
circumstances of the case”. The methodology adopted by the
 
Panel was appropriate to the particular circumstances of the
 
case before it and, therefore, we see no error in the Panel’s
 
reliance
(149)
on it.
There seems to be a note of caution here,but it is far from clear
 
what the Appellate Body is feeling cautious
(150)
about.That it favors a
 
relational approach,which must imply a comparison of something
 
with something else,is not in
(151)
doubt.
For the Panel,the rational relationship test in Article 2.2,devel-
oped in part by reference to the rational relationship test in Article
 
5.1,is presented as encompassing a proportionality
(152)
dimension.“The
 
phytosanitary measure at issue is clearly disproportionate to the risk
 
identified on the basis of the scientific evidence
(153)
available.”The
 
concept of proportionality is contested and unsettled,and the Panel
 
does little to illuminate its
(154)
understanding.
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On the other hand, it seems to suggest that disproportionality
 
will result wherever the measure in question contains elements which
 
are not sufficiently supported by scientific
(155)
data.It is the fact that the
 
Japanese measure contains elements which are not supported by
 
sufficient scientific evidence which“in particular”leads the Panel to
 
its conclusion that the measure at issue is clearly
(156)
disproportionate.
This might be construed as a“least onerous”(weak)conception of
(157)
proportionality.Due to the presence of these elements,the measure
 
goes further than is necessary to guard against the risk
(158)
identified.
Understood in this way,proportionality seems a needlessly provoca-
tive phrase to use, as it simply connotes a requirement that each
 
element of a domestic measure must be supported by sufficient
 
scientific
(159)
evidence.
On the other hand,it is at least credible to argue that the Panel
 
endorsed a more far-reaching (strong)conception of proportionality
 
in this case:“Given the negligible risk identified on the basis of the
 
scientific evidence and the nature of the elements composing the
 
phytosanitary measure at issue, the measure on the face of it is
 
disproportionate to that
(160)
risk.”This might seem to imply a balancing
 
test,according to which the Panel will compare risk,with the“nature
 
of the ...
(161)
measure.”The premises according to which the nature of
 
the measure is assessed are nowhere
(162)
specified. In this case, the
 
element of risk which was seen as relevant was its scale in terms of
 
the propensity of the hazard to
(163)
materialize.The extent to which the
 
seriousness or irreversibility of the potential hazard would be rele-
vant to a balancing conception of proportionality is neither addres-
sed, nor
(164)
clear. It seems inconceivable though that it would be ex-
(165)
cluded.To the extent that the Panel may be thought to have endorsed
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a balancing conception of proportionality,it does nothing to elucidate
 
its methodology for comparing risk and policy reaction, or for
 
evaluating the appropriateness of the relationship between
(166)
them.
However, its decision regarding the Article 5.7 is noteworthy.
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s decision;it stated that“rele-
vant scientific evidence”will be“insufficient”within the meaning of
 
Article 5.7 if the body of available scientific evidence does not allow,
in quantitative or qualitative terms,the performance of an adequate
 
assessment of risks. Prior to this case, the concept of “sufficient”
within the meaning of Article 2.2 and “insufficient”within the
 
meaning of Article 5.7 was not clear. In Japan-Agriculture, the
 
Appellate Body stated that a rational or objective relationship
 
between the SPS measures and the scientific evidence is required to
 
be“sufficient”within the meaning of Article 2.2.With the decision of
 
the Appellate Body in this case,it is now clarified the actual meaning
 
of both concepts.
? Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement
 
As stated before,Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides that
 
Members shall not maintain an SPS measure without sufficient
 
scientific evidence,“except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article
 
5.”Article 5.7 provides that in cases where relevant scientific evi-
dence is insufficient,a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or
 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent informa-
tion.
⑴ The relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.7
 
Article 5.7 is treated as a “qualified exemption,”not as an
 
exception, to
(167)
Article 2.2. It is established in EC-Biotech, that it
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operates as an exemption from the third prong. It may be relevant
 
that Article 5.7 is deemed by the Panel to operate also as exemption
 
to
(168)
Article 5.1.Therefore,any measure consistent with Article 5.7 will
 
not be incompatible with Article 5.1,and consequently not automati-
cally incompatible with either the second or the third prong of
(169)
Article 2.2.However,that a measure is not incompatible with Article
 
5.1 cannot be presumed to imply that it is not incompatible with
(170)
Article 2.2. It is simply that such incompatibility will have to be
 
demonstrated and not assumed,even in the case of the second and
 
third
(171)
prongs.Nonetheless,the construction of a relationship between
 
the risk assessment obligation and the second as well as the third
 
prong of Article 2.2,and between Article 5.7 and Article 5.1,might
 
veer us in the direction of anticipating that Article 5.7 will be recog-
nized as operating as an exemption in relation to the second as well
 
as the third prongs of
(172)
Article 2.2.
⑵ The relationship between Article 5.1 and Article 5.7
 
The relationship between Article 5.1 and Article 5.7 is nowhere
 
defined.On the face of it,conformity with Article 5.7 does not serve
 
to release Members from their risk assessment obligation under
(173)
Article 5.1.However,two factors seem to militate strongly against
 
this“on the face”
(174)
position.These factors tend instead to lead us in
 
the direction of the conclusion that conformity with Article 5.7
 
implies a time-limited reprieve from the requirements of
(175)
Article 5.1.
First,there is the way in which the Appellate Body has interpret-
ed Article 5.7 in relation to
(176)
Article 5.1.Insufficiency in the context of
 
Article 5.7 has been explicitly construed by reference to the Article
 
5.1 risk assessment
(177)
requirement.Scientific evidence will be regarded
 
as insufficient under Article 5.7 where it is not such to allow, in
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quantitative or qualitative terms,an adequate risk
(178)
assessment.The
 
absence of an adequate risk assessment under Article 5.1 is thus a
 
prerequisite for recourse to
(179)
Article 5.7.Unless Article 5.7 is regarded
 
as a qualified exemption to Article 5.1,it would never be possible for
 
Members to comply with both Article 5.1 and 5.7
(180)
simultaneously.
Where scientific evidence is insufficient it would be impossible for
 
Members to base their measures on an Article 5.1 risk
(181)
assessment.
Second is regarding the relationship between Article 2.2 and 5.1.
The two are to be read together, each deriving meaning from the
(182)
other.More particularly,Article 5.1 is regarded as a specific manifes-
tation of Article 2.2 and,as such,a breach of Article 5.1 is recognized
 
as implying a breach of
(183)
Article 2.2.Thus,conformity with Article 5.7
(and consequently Article 2.2)would be bought at the expense of
 
conformity with
(184)
Article 5.1.A failure to conform with Article 5.1 in
 
turn implies a failure to conform with
(185)
Article 2.2.It would,of course,
be open to the Appellate Body to refine its understanding of the
 
relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.1,whereby a breach of
 
Article 5.1 would imply a breach of Article 2.2,except in the circum-
stances laid down in
(186)
Article 5.7.However,no such qualification has
 
been established
(187)
so far.
Article 5.1, unlike Article 2.2, does not refer to Article 5.7.
However,the Appellate Body has constructed a relationship between
 
these articles by virtue of its relational understanding of the concept
 
of sufficiency in
(188)
Article 5.7. The construction of this substantive
 
relationship between Article 5.7 and 5.1 both increases the impor-
tance of the question of their structural relation,and would seem to
 
militate strongly in the direction of Article 5.7 being seen as a
 
qualified exemption to the Article 5.1 risk assessment
(189)
requirement.
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This is the conclusion reached by the Panel in the EC-Biotech case.
It stated that“we conclude that Article 5.7 should be characterized as
 
a right also in relation to Article 5.1,rather than an exception from
 
a “general obligation”under Article 5.1. In our view, Article 5.7
 
operates as a qualified exemption from the obligation under Article
 
5.1 to base SPS measures on a risk
(190)
assessment.”
⑶ Background condition:insufficient scientific evidence
 
Article 5.7 is applicable if relevant scientific evidence is insuffi-
cient. In Japan-Apples, the Appellate Body emphasized that the
 
concepts inherent in Article 5.7 should be understood as relational
(191)
concepts.It stated that“‘relevant scientific evidence’will be‘insuffi-
cient’within the meaning of Article 5.7 if the body of available
 
scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative
 
terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as
 
required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the SPS
(192)
Agreement.”Thus, the key question is whether available scientific
 
evidence is such to permit the performance of a risk assessment
 
meeting the demands of
(193)
Article 5.1.
⑷ Additional latitude:basing measures on available pertinent
 
information
 
Provisional measures must be based on available pertinent infor-
mation.The questions that arise are:? what is to count as available
 
pertinent information,and? what it means to base a measure upon
 
such information which is insufficient or insufficiently reliable to
 
count as a fully fledged risk
(194)
assessment.
Regarding?,what is to count as available pertinent information
 
has not been defined. However, it is clear that this is to include
 
information from the relevant international organizations as well as
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from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other
(195)
Members.
There can be no doubt that information deriving from Codex
 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Con-
vention,and the Office of Epizootics(as defined in Annex A⑶)will
 
be regarded as
(196)
available. In defining the scope of the concept of
 
international standards, Annex A⑶ looks also to other “relevant
 
international organizations”in so far as these are open to all
 
Members, and have been identified by the SPS
(197)
Committee. The
 
committee has not, to date, identified any additional international
 
organization as a source of international standards for the purpose of
 
this agree-
(198)
ment.By contrast to the Annex,however,Article 5.7 would
 
seem to make the “relevance”of the organization and the “perti-
nence”of the information,the only
(199)
criteria.As such,pertinent infor-
mation deriving from any relevant body would seem to fall within the
 
range of information to be
(200)
considered.
As for?,this has been deemed to require a rational or objective
 
relationship between the measure and the evidence upon which it is
 
said to be
(201)
based.In the context of Article 5.7,however,the informa-
tion in question is,by definition,insufficient or insufficiently reliable,
to ground a risk
(202)
assessment.Given the nature of the information,it
 
is hard to know what it means to say that there is a rational relation-
ship between this and the provisional measure in
(203)
question.Elsewhere,
the Appellate Body has construed “based on”as requiring a strong
 
and close relationship between a prospective measure and existing
 
international
(204)
standards.
⑸ ProvisionalityⅠ:seeking additional information
 
In Japan-Agriculture,the Appellate Body observed that neither
 
Article 5.7 nor any other provision of the SPS Agreement “sets out
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explicit prerequisites regarding the additional information to be
 
collected or a specific collection procedure.”Nor does it “specify
 
what actual results must be
(205)
achieved.”The obligation is merely to
 
seek to obtain the additional information, in order to allow the
 
Member to conduct a more objective assessment of risk, in accor-
dance with
(206)
Article 5.1.“Therefore the information must be germane
 
to conducting such a risk assessment,i.e.the evaluation of the likeli-
hood of entry,establishment or spread of,in casu,a pest,according
 
to the SPS measure which may be
(207)
applied.”In Japan-Apples, the
 
Appellate Body confirmed the finding of the Panel that Japan had not
 
satisfied this
(208)
requirement. The information collected by Japan did
 
not examine the appropriateness of the SPS measure in question,and
 
did not address the “core issue”of whether there is variation in
 
quarantine efficiency as between different
(209)
varieties.
⑹ ProvisionalityⅡ:reviewing measures within reasonable pe-
riod of time
 
In Japan-Agriculture,the Appellate Body confirmed that analy-
sis of this temporal issue should proceed on a case-by-case basis,and
 
that it will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case,
including the difficulty of obtaining the additional information neces-
sary for the review,and the characteristics of the SPS measure in
(210)
question.In the circumstances of this case,the Panel had found that
 
collecting the additional necessary information would have been
“relatively
(211)
easy.”The failure of Japan to review its measure during
 
the period since the entry into force of the WTO Agreement(a period
 
of nearly four years)was thus deemed to constitute a failure to
 
review the measure within a reasonable period of
(212)
time.
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? The measure and the Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement
⑴ Overview
 
As stated above,the Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement requires
 
that the SPS measure is based on scientific principles,and should not
 
be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence(except as pro-
vided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5).
According to the Appellate Body’s decision at Japan-Agricul-
ture,the obligation in Article 2.2 requires that there be a rational or
 
objective relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific
 
evidence,and that whether there is a rational relationship between an
 
SPS measure and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a case
-by-case basis and will depend upon the particular circumstances of
 
the case,including the characteristics of the measure at issue and the
 
quality and quantity of the scientific
(213)
evidence.
⑵ Scientific principles of contamination
 
Based on the above argument,the next issue is whether the SPS
 
measure is based on scientific principles.Specifically,the effects of
 
radio-contaminated food on human body should be discussed.
According to the International Commission on Radiological
 
Protection, the following is the data on effects exerted on human
 
body by radiation.
? Early and Late Reactions in Tissues and Organs (ICRP
 
Publication 103 (A69))
Threshold doses for some tissue and organ reactions in the more
 
radiosensitive tissues in the body are shown in Table 1.These have
 
been deduced from various radiotherapeutic experiences and acciden-
tal exposure incidents. In general, fractionated doses or protracted
 
doses at low dose rate are less damaging than are acute doses.
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Table 1.Estimates of the thresholds for tissue effect in the adult human testes,
ovaries, lens and bone marrow
 
Tissue and effect  Threshold dose
 
Total dose
 
received in
 
a single
 
brief
 
exposure
(Gy)
Total dose
 
received in
 
highly
 
fractionated
 
or
 
protracted
 
exposures
(Gy)
Annual dose rate if received
 
yearly in highly fractionated
 
or protracted exposures for
 
many years(Gy y-1)
Tests Temporary
 
sterility
 
0.15 －?? 0.4
 
Permanent sterility  3.5～6.0 － 2.0
 
Ovaries Sterility  2.5～6.0  6.0 ＞0.2
 
Lens
 
Detectable opacities 0.5～2.0  5 ＞0.1
 
Visual impairment
(cataract)
5.0?? ＞8 ＞0.15
 
Bone marrow
 
Depression of
 
hematopoiesis
 
0.5 － ＞0.4
1) Not applicable.Since the threshold is dependent on dose rate rather than on total
 
dose.
2) Given as 2-10 Sv for acute dose threshold.
? Effects in the Embryo and Fetus
 
As regards effects of radioactive exposure on embryos and
 
fetuses,the report offers the opinion that a threshold dose of 100～200
 
mGy or higher exists;if the fetal dose exceeds this level,there is a
 
possibility of posing damage on fetus,while its severity and scope
 
vary with the dose and pregnancy stage.
? Nonstochastic Effects (ICRP Publication 40 (Appendix A:
A1～A7))
Nonstochastic effects can appear in any organ or tissue that has
 
been irradiated to a sufficiently high dose,the biological response and
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threshold depending on the organ or tissue.Uniform irradiation of the
 
bone marrow by acute exposure in the early phase of the whole,or a
 
substantial part,of the body to penetrating radiation at a sufficiently
 
high rate can lead to death within a few weeks.The value for the
 
median lethal dose within 60 days(LD50/60)is thought to be in the
 
range 2.5 to 5 Gy;below about 1.5 Gy there is little possibility of early
 
death.
? Stochastic Effects (ICRP Publication 40 (Paragraph 27,
Appendix A:A8))
The likely incidence of stochastic effects in an irradiated popula-
tion can be estimated by the use of risk factors,given that estimates
 
of the dose equivalents in organs and tissues have been made.
In ICRP Publication 26(1971),it is stated that the risk factors
 
have been chosen as far as possible to apply in practice for the
 
purposes of radiation protection. These risk factors, which are
 
averages over both sexes and all ages,are shown in Table.3.These
 
factors represent the incidence of fatal cancer following irradiation
 
of a range of body organs and tissues, together with the risk of
 
hereditary defects in the first two generations following exposure at
 
levels of dose in the range relevant for protection.
Table 3. ICRP Risk Factors for fatal cancers and hereditary defects
 
Tissue  Risk Factors(Sv-1)
Gonads  40×10-4??
Breast  25×10-4
 
Red Bone Marrow  20×10-4
 
Lung  20×10-4
 
Thyroid  5×10-4
 
Bone  5×10-4
 
All remaining unspecified tissues  50×10-4
1) Herediatry defects in first two generations
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? Risks of Leukemia and Childhood Cancer
 
It is assumed that throughout the pregnancy period,the embryo/
fetus is exposed to the risk of latent carcinogenic effect to the same
 
degree as infant.According to Paragraph(38)of the ICRP Publica-
tion 84 (2000),relative risk of spontaneous cancer incidence at the
 
fetal dose about 10 mGy is about 1.4 or lower.
? Risk of Fatal Cancer
 
The risk figure for fatal cancers suggested by ICRP (1987) is
 
about 2×10??Sv??averaged over age and sex.An average individual
 
exposed to 5 mSv as a result of ingestion of radioactively contaminat-
ed foodstuffs in the first year after a radiation accident therefore has
 
a notional lifetime risk of 1 in 10 000(10??).This level of risk is some
 
three orders of magnitude greater than the average individual risk of
 
fatal cancer resulting from routine operations of nuclear power
 
establishments.
⑶ Summary
 
From above information, we can conclude that  radio-
contaminated food has certain effects on human body.The effects
 
are? early and late reactions in tissues and organs,? stochastic
 
effects,and? risk of fatal cancer.
As stated above,the Appellate Body admits broad discretions of
 
Members imposing SPS measures,and it requires a rational relation-
ship between the measure and the risk assessment as in EC-Hor-
mones, and “a rational or objective relationship between the SPS
 
measures and the scientific evidence”as in Japan-Agriculture.The
 
above data regarding effects of radiological contamination to the
 
human body demonstrates objective evidence as to the level of thresh-
old dose as well as the specific outcomes;they are evidence of both
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in terms of the quality and quantity, and therefore considered to
 
verify a rational relationship between the SPS measure of the FDA
 
and the scientific evidence.Therefore,one can conclude that the SPS
 
measure of the FDA is not maintained without sufficient scientific
 
evidence according to the Japan-Agriculture case.This also leads to
 
a conclusion that there is a rational relationship between the SPS
 
measure and the risk assessment as in the EC-Hormones case.
Therefore, the SPS measure of the FDA can be evaluated as
 
necessary to protect human health and is justified under Article 2.2 of
 
the SPS Agreement.
? The measure and the Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement
 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires Members to ensure
 
that their SPS measures are based on an assessment of the risks to
 
human,animal or plant life or health in order to be justified.Accord-
ing to the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones,“it is essential to bear in
 
mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under
 
Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory
 
operating under strictly controlled conditions,but also risk in human
 
societies as they actually exist, in other words,the actual potential
 
for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people
 
live and work
(214)
and die.”It is also worthwhile to note that the
 
Appellate Body ruled that in order to regard that an SPS measure is
“based on”a risk assessment,there should be“a rational relationship
 
between the measure and the risk
(215)
assessment.”It also concluded that
 
a risk assessment has to come to a monolithic conclusion that
 
coincides with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in the SPS
 
measure.According to the Appellate Body,the risk assessment could
(37)164立正法学論集第50巻第２号 (2017)
set out both the prevailing view representing the “mainstream”of
 
scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists taking a
 
divergent
(216)
view.
It may seem as though the SPS measure of the FDA violates
 
Article 11.1 of the GATT. However, considering the effect of
 
contaminated food to the human body, it is clear that radio-
contaminated food has actual potential for adverse effects on human
 
health,given that the dose level is clarified with respect to early and
 
late reactions in tissues and organs, stochastic effects, and risk of
 
fatal cancer.
Also,one should be able to say that there is a rational relation-
ship between the SPS measure of the FDA and the risk assessment.
Accordingly, based on the data of adverse effects on human
 
health,the SPS measure of the FDA is justified and does not violate
 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
? The measure and the Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement
(provisional SPS measures)
In cases where scientific evidence regarding adverse effects on
 
human health is considered to be insufficient,and therefore does not
 
suffice the requirements provided by the Article 2.2 of the SPS
 
Agreement,a Member may provisionally adopt SPS measures on the
 
basis of available pertinent information (Article 5.7 of the SPS
 
Agreement).
As stated above,according to Japan－Apples,“relevant scientific
 
evidence”will be“insufficient”within the meaning of Article 5.7 if
 
the body of available scientific evidence does not allow,in quantita-
tive or qualitative terms,the performance of an adequate assessment
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of risks as required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the
 
SPS Agreement.
If the legitimacy of the SPS measure of the FDA were argued at
 
the Panel,the level of clarification with respect to adverse effect of
 
radiological contamination both in terms of the level of threshold
 
dose and specific content of adverse effect on human body would be
 
one of the critical points.
?? Conclusion
 
Overall, it is highly likely that the SPS measure of the FDA is
 
considered to be in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
 
SPS Agreement. On this basis, Japan should continue a serious
 
commitment to response to the Fukushima nuclear accident.At the
 
same time, Japan should provide accurate information regarding
 
radiological materials that are found from food produced in Fuku-
shima prefecture. Should there be any other scientific evidence
 
available that can alter the SPS measure of the FDA,Japan should
 
demonstrate such evidence,so that it can mitigate consumers’con-
cern over radiological contamination of food.
To conclude,Japan should seek its way to buttress its free trade
 
policy through negotiation as opposed to using the dispute settlement
 
process of the WTO;specifically,Japan should consider provision of
 
new scientific evidence regarding radiological contamination and
 
negotiation with the United States of America to lift the shipment
 
restraint (proposition of easing of regulations or less restrictive
 
alternatives).
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